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Introduction
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Iraq's almost seven month occu-
pation of Kuwait ended on March 2, 1991, when Kuwait was liberated by
the United Nations Allied Coalition and Kuwaiti armed forces. As a conse-
quence of the invasion and liberation, Kuwait's "electric power, telecommu-
nications and transportation systems [were] wrecked, [and its] government
buildings and other public institutions heavily damaged or looted."' More-
over, "much of the country's petroleum industry was pillaged and
sabotaged" as was "graphically evidenced by the hundreds of fires that
were set off by blowing up the oil wells."'2 In response to the damage
caused by Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the international com-
munity created the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC).
3
On December 18, 1996, the UNCC's Governing Council approved the
recommendations made by a panel of commissioners and awarded the
Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) $610,048,547 for its claim against Iraq based
on the costs KOC incurred fighting the massive oil well fires left burning in
Kuwait after the country's liberation.4 The claim, which is officially
reported by its UNCC claim title as the "Well Blowout Control Claim"
(WBC Claim), was the first category "E" corporate claim decided by the
Commission. The approval of the WBC Claim award, together with the
appointment by the Governing Council of two additional panels to review
category "E" corporate claims and the first two panels to review category
"F" claims, marks a shift in the Commission's focus from small individual
claims to the larger and more complex corporate and government claims.
5
1. Report to the Secretary-General by a United Nations Mission, Led by Mr.
Abdulrahim A Farah, Former Under-Secretary-General, Assessing the Scope of Damage and
Nature of Damage Inflicted on Kuwait's Infrastructure During the Iraqi Occupation of the
Country from 2 August 1990 to 27 February 1991, U.N. SCOR, 46' Year, Annex, U.N.
Doc. S/22535 (1991).
2. Id. at 15.
3. For a discussion regarding the creation of the UNCC by the Security Council,
see infra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
4. Decision Concerning the Well Blowout Control Claim [Dec. 40], U.N. SCOR, U.N.
Compensation Comm'n Governing Council, 51 t Year, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.40
(1996). See also Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners
Appointed to Review the Well Blowout Control Claim (the "WBC Claim"), U.N. SCOR, U.N.
Compensation Comm'n Governing Council, 51t Year, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1996/R.27/
Annex (1996) [hereinafter WBC Claim Report].
5. See, e.g., United Nations Information Service Press Release, United Nations Com-
pensation Commission Appoints Commissioners for the Review of Higher Amounts Individ-
ual Claims, Corporate Claims and Governmental Claims, U.N. Doc. IK/96/7 (1996);
JeffreyJannuzzo, On Two Fast-Track UN Agreements, THE TIMES (London), Dec. 24, 1996,
at 29.
The Governing Council established six categories of claims to be filed with the United
Nations Compensation Commission:
1. Category "A" claims are individual claims for departure from Iraq or Kuwait;
2. Category "B" claims are individual claims for serious personal injury or
death;
3. Category "C" claims are individual claims for damages up to US$100,000;
4. Category "D" claims are individual claims for damages over US$100,000;
5. Category "E" claims are claims of corporations and other entities;
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Since it began operations in 1991, the Commission has, for humanita-
rian reasons, focused its attention on resolving the claims of individual
victims of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. 6 As of March 1997,
the Commission had processed and approved for payment approximately
862,000 category "A" claims for persons forced to depart from Iraq and
Kuwait. Of these approved claims, 57,636 have been paid in full. 7 Further,
the UNCC has processed and paid in full approximately 4,000 category "B"
claims for severe personal injury or death.8 Also, the Commission had
processed and approved for payment approximately 201,000 category "C"
claims for personal losses or damages valued up to $100,000. 9 Due to the
huge number of claimants, the majority of the category "A," "B" and "C"
claims were verified using, in part, techniques developed to deal with mass
tort claims in the United States.10
Unlike most of the individual claims,1' many of the corporate and gov-
ernment claims assert losses in the millions and even billions of dollars.
The total asserted value of the more than 6,000 category "E" claims is $82
billion and that of the 282 category "F" claims is over $100 billion.12 Due
to their magnitude, these claims will require a closer review by the Com-
mission than was applied to claims in the individual loss categories. In
fact, if the WBC Claim precedent is followed, the proceedings in categories
6. Category "F" claims are claims of Governments and international
organizations.
U.N. Compensation Comm'n, The Claims (visited Sept. 16, 1997) <http://
vvww.unog.ch/uncc/claims.htm>.
6. SeeJannuzzo, supra note 5, at 29.
7. See United Nations Compensation Commission Pays Out $144 Million, M2 PRESS-
NWiR, Mar. 18, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwd File; Compensation Com-
mission to Pay Additional Claims Early Next Year If Iraq Begins Selling Oil in December, M2
PmRsswrnR, Dec. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwd File.
8. See United Nations Compensation Commission Pays Out $144 Million, supra note 7.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Con-
cerning the First Installment of Individual Claims for Damages Up to US$100,000 (Category
"C" Claims), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Compensation Comm'n, 49"h Year, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/
1994/R.18 (1994) [hereinafter "C" Report], reprinted in 2 GuLF WAR CLaIMS REP. No. 1,
at II/R-119 (1995) [hereinafter GuLF WAR CreaMs RP.] ("Proceedings in the context of
mass torts, primarily in the United States, have developed sophisticated methods for
resolving massive filings."). See also Christopher S. Gibson, Mass Claims Processing: Tech-
niques for Processing Over 400,000 Claims for Individual Loss at the United Nations Com-
pensation Commission, in THE UNaED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISStON [Thirteenth
Sokol Colloquium] (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1995) [hereinafter UNTED NATIONS COMP NSA-
TION COMMISSION].
11. There are approximately 11,000 individual claims filed in category "D," the cate-
gory for claims asserting losses in excess of $100,000. See U.N. Compensation
Comm'n, supra note 5. These claims resemble both the smaller individual claims in the
"A," "B" and "C" categories and the typically larger corporate and government claims in
the "E" and "F" categories. Based on my experience with the Commission, I consider it
likely that these category "D" claims will be processed using a mix of verification tech-
niques, including the mass tort claim methods used in categories "A," "B" and "C," and
the more rigorous methods used to process the corporate and government claims dis-
cussed herein.
12. See Neil King, Firms Seek Billions of Dollars to Cover Gulf War Losses, WAU ST.J.
(Eur. ed.), Aug. 19, 1997, at 1; U.N. Compensation Comm'n, The Claims, supra note 5.
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"E" and "F," at least for the large and complex claims, may more closely
resemble traditional arbitrations, in which both parties make submissions
and proffer evidence to the Panel, than the mass-processing approach taken
in processing claims in categories "A," "B," and "C". The category "E" and
"F" claims present the Commission with a significant challenge: to review
and decide the merits of those claims in a speedy fashion while still provid-
ing due process to Iraq.
This Article focuses on the institutional framework that has been cre-
ated to allow the Commission to meet this challenge. Part I reviews the
establishment of the Commission by the United Nations Security Council.
Part II discusses the nature and purpose of the Commission's proceedings,
including the roles of the Secretariat and the panels of Commissioners.
Finally, Part III examines the procedural rules governing the verification of
claims by the panels making specific reference to the WBC Claim
experience.
I. The Establishment of the Commission
Although claims commissions are not new to international law,13 scholars
heralded the establishment of the Commission by the United Nations as
"unique" and "unprecedented."' 4 Indeed, the UNCC is the first claims
commission of its kind established by the Security Council. 15 On April 8,
13. See David J. Bederman, The United Nations Compensation Commission and the
Tradition of International Claims Settlement, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1994).
14. Id. at 1-2. Also,
The creation of the Fund and the Commission represent a remarkable milestone
in international law as a reparations system with a built-in enforcement mecha-
nism. While possible because of the unique nature of the international oil mar-
kets, the Fund could represent a watershed in establishing a means other than
force to impose international law in the wake of war.
GULF WAR CLAIMs REP., supra note 10, at II-1; Stanley J. Glod, International Claims Aris-
ing from Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 25 INT'L LAw. 713, 719 (1991) ("A multinational or
international claims tribunal is without precedent."). But see Bederman, supra note 13,
at 2 ("[T]he UNCC is not as original or as unique as one might suppose. I believe,
instead, that the UNCC is part of a long tradition of international claims practice.").
15. The creation of the Commission and its role in international law has spawned
numerous publications and law journal articles. See, e.g., MARco FRIGESSI DI RATrALMA,
NAzIoNi UNITE E D Nui DERIvAIl DALLA GUERRA DEI. GOLFO (Dott. A. Giuffr ed., 1995);
Bachir Georges Affaki, The United Nations Compensation Commission-A New Era in
Claims Settlements?, 10 J. INT'L ARB. 21 (1993); Bachir Georges Affaki, La Commission
d'indemnisation des Nations Unies: Trois Ans D'epreuve au Service du Reglement des Difftr-
ends Internationaux, 20 DR. & PRAT. COMM. INTERN. 471 (1994); Carlos Alzamora, Reflec-
tions on the UN Compensation Commission, 9 ARB. INT'L 349 (1993); Pierre d'Argent, Le
Fonds et la Commission de Compensation des Nations Unies, 25 REV. BELGE DE DROIT INT'L
485 (1992); ASIL Proceedings, Claims Against Iraq: The UN Compensation Commission
and Other Remedies, 1992 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROc. 477; Markham Ball, The Iraq Claims
Process-A Progress Report, 9 J. INT'L APB. 37 (1992); Ronald J. Bettauer, The United
Nations Compensation Commission-Developments Since October 1992, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
416 (1995); Charles N. Brower, The Lessons of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal:
How May They Be Applied in the Case of Iraq?, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 421 (1992); Charles N.
Brower, Lessons to be Drawn from the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 9 J. INT'L ARB. 51 (1992);
Charles N. Brower, The United Nations Sets the Stage for Gulf War Compensation Claims, 8
J. INT'L. ARB. 7 (1991); John R. Crook, The United Nations Compensation Commission: A
Vol. 31
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1991, in Resolution 687, the Security Council declared that Iraq's aggres-
sion in Kuwait made it "liable under international law for any direct loss,
damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural
resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations,
[resulting from its] unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait."'
6
In making this declaration, the Security Council was "conscious of the
need to take [such] measures.., under Chapter VII of the Charter."17 The
WBC Claim Panel took note of this reference to Chapter VII in Resolution
687 when it held that the Security Council "exercised its powers under that
Chapter to maintain and restore international peace and security."
1 8
New Structure to Enforce State Responsibility, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 144 (1993); Gilles Cotter-
eau, Responsabilite de l'Iraq: Apercu Sur les Indemnisations Urgentes des Personnel Phy-
siques, XLI ANN. FR. DE DR. INT. 151 (1995); Gilles Cottereau, De la Responsabilite de
L'Iraq Selon la Resolution 687 du Conseil de Securitt, XXXVII ANN. FL. DE DR. INT. 99
(1991); Marco Frigessi di Rattalma, Le Regime de Responsabilite Internationale Institu6
par le Conseil D'administration de la Commission de Compensation des Nations Unies,
1010 Ray. Gt. DR. I. PUBL. 45 (1997); Bernhard Graefrath, Iraqi Reparations and the
Security Council, 44 Z. AOR. u. V. (1995) [hereinafter Iraqi Reparations]; Bernhard
Graefrath & Manfred Mohr, Legal Consequences of an Act of Aggression: The Case of the
Iraqi Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait, 43 Osmna. ZEITSCHR. F. OFF. REcirr 109 (1992);
Veijo Heiskanen, Yhdistyneiden Kansakuntien Korvauskomissio, 3 LAMxnF.S 404 (1995);
William E. Huth, Iraq Claims Tribunal: A New Approach to the Settlement of International
Commercial Disputes, 23 INT'L Bus. LAw. 430 (1995); Adam A. Levy, The Persian Gulf
War Cease-Fire Agreement Compared with the Japanese Peace Treaty in Terms of Reparations
and Reconstruction, 10 DicK.J. INr'L L. 541 (1992); Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice
of the United States Relating to International Law, 86 AM. J. IN''L L. 346 (1992); Arthur
W. Rovine, An Iraqi Claims Process: Where and How?, 2 AM. REv. INTL. ARB. 102 (1992);
Arthur W. Rovine, An Iraqi Claims Process: Where and How?, 1 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 411
(1992); Major Walter G. Sharp, Sr., The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage
During Armed Conflict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, 137 MIL. L. REv. 1
(1992); Brigette Stern, Un Systeme Hybride: la Procedure de Reglement Pour la Reparation
des Dommages Resultant de L'occupation Illicite du Koweit par l'Irak, 37 McGILL LJ. 625
(1992); Sompong Sucharitkul, The Process of Peace-Making Following Operation "Desert
Storm", 43 OSTERR. ZEITSCH. F. OFF. REcHT 1 (1992); Nicolas C. Ulmer, The Gulf War
Claims Institution, 10J. INT'L ARB. 85 (1993); Carmel Whelton, The United Nations Com-
pensation Commission and International Claims Law: A Fresh Approach, 25 O-rAWA L.
REv. 607 (1993); Norbert Wfihler, Ansprflche Gegen Irak vor der United Nations Compen-
sation Commission, REcHT utND PRAxs DER SCHIEDSGERIcHTSBARKEIT, Beilage 5 zu BEmuEBs-
BEa AnR 23 (1996); RexJ. Zedalis, Gulf War Compensation Standard: Concerns Under the
Charter, 26 REv. BELGE D.I. 333 (1993).
See also ElyseJ. Garmise, The Iraqi Claims Process and the Ghost of Versailles, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 840 (1992); Luan Low & David Hodgkinson, Compensation for Wartime Environ-
mental Damage: Challenges to International Law After the Gulf War, 35 VA.J. INf'L L. 405
(1995); Gregory Townsend, Note, The Iraq Claims Process: A Progress Report on the
United Nations Compensation Commission & U.S. Remedies, 17 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMp.
LJ. 973 (1995).
16. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Year, Res. & Dec. at 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 847, 852 (1991). As early as October 1990, the Security
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, had "reminded" Iraq
that, "under international law it is liable for any loss damage or injury arising in regard
to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the inva-
sion and illegal occupation of Kuwait...." S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 45th Year, Res. &
Dec. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1561, 1563 (1990).
17. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 16, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. at 849.
18. WBC Claim Report, supra note 4, 1 67, at 22. The Security Council's authority
under Chapter VII to establish a compensation commission has, however, been ques-
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To implement Resolution 687, the Security Council directed the Secre-
tary-General to create a fund to compensate the victims of Iraq's aggression
and ordered Iraq to contribute to the fund based on a percentage of the
value of its future petroleum exports. 19 One month after passing Resolu-
tion 687 and in response to a report by the U.N. Secretary-General, 20 the
Security Council established the UNCC as a subsidiary organ at the United
Nations' European headquarters in Geneva.
21
The UNCC is composed of three bodies: the Governing Council, the
Commissioners, and the Secretariat. The Governing Council, whose mem-
bership reflects the composition of the Security Council at any given time,
is responsible for "establishing guidelines on all policy matters . . .
[organizing] the work of the Commission and the procedures to be applied
to the processing of claims and to the settlement of disputed claims ....
Importantly, the "amounts recommended by the panels of Commissioners
tioned by some commentators. See, e.g., Garmise, supra note 15, at 864 ("The U.N.
Charter does not give the Security Council the specific power to deal with war repara-
tions or the adjudication of war claims."); Graefrath, Iraqi Reparations, supra note 15, at
22 ("The establishment of the Compensation Fund and the Compensation Commission
by res. 692 (1991) as well as the imposition of the procedure applied by the Commission
on Iraq and other member States of the United Nations and the confiscation of Iraqi
assets according to res. 778 (1992) is clearly outside the competence of the Security
Council and cannot be justified as a measure taken under Chapter VII of the Charter to
restore peace."). But see Frederick L. Kirgis, Claims Settlement and the United Nations
Legal Structure, in UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, supra note 10, at 115
("The Security Council has the authority under articles 24 and 29 to create compensa-
tion commissions to adjudicate claims stemming from breaches of the peace or acts of
aggression. It could do so with binding effect, and without the consent of the respon-
dent state."); Lawrence D. Roberts, United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 and its
Aftermath: The Implications for Domestic Authority and the Need for Legitimacy, 25 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 593 (1993) ("The only significant restriction upon potential Security
Council authority emanates from the political will of its members. Once this hurdle has
been overcome, however, and an affirmative statement of purpose has been produced,
the constitutional authority of the Security Council to take action is virtually unlim-
ited."); VEIJO HEiSKANEN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ToPIcs 344 (1992) (To meet the "stan-
dards of substantive due process," a United Nations sanction resolution "must be
rationally related to a legitimate organizational purpose . . ."). At a minimum, a good
argument exists that Resolution 687 meets such a due process test because there appears
to be a rational relationship between restoring international peace and security and the
establishment of a commission to compensate war victims.
19. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 16, 'c 18-19, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. at 852.
20. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 19 of Security Council Reso-
lution 687 (1991), U.N. SCOR, 46" Year, U.N. Doc. S/22559 (1991) [hereinafter Secre-
tary-General's Report], reprinted in GULF WAR CIMs REP., supra note 10, at II/M-1.
21. S.C. Res. 692, U.N. SCOR, 46"' Year, Res. & Dec. at 3, U.N. Doc S/RES/692
(1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 864 (1991). The WBC Claim Panel noted that the "Secur-
ity Council also acted under Chapter VII when making resolution 692 (1991), in which
it decided to establish the Commission... Under article 29 of the Charter, '[tlhe Secur-
ity Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the perform-
ance of its functions.'" WBC Claim Report, supra note 4, at 69 n.15.
22. Secretary-General's Report, reprinted in GULF WAR CtAIMS REP., supra note 10, 11
19, at II/M-4.
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[are] subject to approval by the Governing Council."23 The Governing
Council's decisions are final and "are not subject to appeal or review on
procedural, substantive or other grounds."
24
The Commissioners, who serve on three-member panels, are required
to have expertise in fields such as "finance, law, accountancy, insurance
and environmental damage assessment."25 As discussed below, the Com-
missioners have the primary responsibility for determining the outcome of
the claims. Each panel of Commissioners must "report in writing... to the
Governing Council on the claims received and the amount recommended
to be awarded for each claimant."26 Finally, the Secretariat is charged with
providing administrative, technical and legal services to the Governing
Council and the Commissioners.
27
These three bodies reflect the various roles of the Commission, which
include policy-making, administration, fact-finding, adjudication, and
financial evaluation.28 Together, these bodies form a largely self-contained
organization capable of administering the entire claims process with little
need for assistance from the Security Council or from any other interna-
tional or national governmental or judicial body.29
The Security Council directed the Commission to establish a "process
by which [Iraqi] funds will be allocated and claims paid" and to establish
"appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, listing claims and verifying
23. Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Compensation Comm'n
Governing Council, 47' Year, art. 40(1), U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/INF.1 (1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1053 (1992) [hereinafter Rules].
24. Id. art. 40(4). Article 41 of the Rules does provide, however, that
"[c]omputational, clerical, typographical or other errors brought to the attention of the
Executive Secretary within 60 days from the publication of the decisions and reports will
be reported ... to the Governing Council. The Governing Council will decide whether
any action is necessary." Id. art. 41. The reference in article 41 to "other errors"
appears to give the Governing Council wider discretion in correcting awards than would
be permitted under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission of Interna-
tional Trade Law which refer only to "any errors of a similar nature." UuT= NArlONS,
UNCITRAL ARBmIA-ON RULEs art. 36(1) (1977).
25. Secretary-General's Report, reprinted in GULF WAR CLAIMS REP., supra note 10,
5, at II/M-4.
26. Rules, supra note 23, art. 38(e).
27. Id. art. 34. See also Secretary-General's Report, reprinted in GuLF WA CLAIMS
REP., supra note 10, '1 12, at II/M-4.
28. See Secretary-General's Report, reprinted in GULF WA CLtaMS REP., supra note 10,
cl 4, at II/M-2. The Commission's financial responsibilities include, inter alia, making
arrangements for ensuring payments by Iraq to the Compensation fund. See, e.g.,
Arrangements for Ensuring Payments to the Compensation Fund, U.N. Compensation
Comm'n Governing Council, 1st Sess., 10th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/2, reprinted
in GULF WAR CtQAis REP., supra note 10, at II/GC-7; Arrangements for Ensuring Payments
to the Compensation Fund, U.N. Compensation Comm'n Governing Council, 2nd Sess.,
15th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/6, reprinted in GULF WAR CLAIMs REP., supra note
10, at II/GC-15.
29. Notwithstanding its independent structure, the Commission is dependent upon
the United Nations offices in Geneva and New York to approve its budget and to recruit
its personnel. Given the concern over delay in processing the large number of claims
submitted to the UNCC, it might be appropriate for the Commission to have more inde-
pendence in these matters, particularly in light of the fact that the Commission's func-
tions are not financed by the regular U.N. budget.
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their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect of Iraq's liability."30
Accordingly, on June 26, 1992, the Governing Council adopted the "Provi-
sional Rules for Claims Procedure." 3 1 Among other things, the Rules spe-
cifically set forth the law that the Commissioners must apply to the claims:
In considering the claims, Commissioners will apply Security Council Reso-
lution 687 (1991) and other relevant Security Council resolutions, the crite-
ria established by the Governing Council for particular categories of claims,
and any pertinent decisions of the Governing Council. In addition, where
necessary, Commissioners shall apply other relevant rules of international
law.32
Accordingly, the panels of Commissioners are the officers of a special legal
system developed by the Security Council to process claims against Iraq.
Nevertheless, "where necessary" in the claims process, the panels are
directed to apply relevant rules of international law.
33
II. The Nature of the Commission's Proceedings
The foregoing brief review of the establishment and structure of the Com-
mission makes clear that the UNCC is not a court or arbitral tribunal in the
traditional sense. Moreover, the UNCC differs from the mixed claims com-
missions that have been a common feature of international dispute resolu-
tion over the past 200 years.34 For example, one difference between the
Commission's proceedings and the proceedings of the more traditional
international tribunals and claims commissions is the fact that the Com-
missioners are not appointed by the claimants, by Iraq, or by interested
governments. 3 5 Rather, they are nominated by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations and appointed by the Governing Council. 36 Commission-
ers are not, however, employees of the Secretariat. Instead, the Commis-
sioners serve in their personal capacities in order to ensure their
independence in the claims process.
3 7
Another unique feature of the Commission is that the processing of
claims does not use the typical adversarial model. 38 Generally, the claim-
ants have been permitted only one submission in which to prove their
claims and Iraq has not been permitted to file a response to the claims as a
matter of right.39 To prevent long delays in the processing of claims, the
Governing Council required the Commission not to adopt the adversarial
30. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 16, 1 19, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. at 852.
31. See Rules, supra note 23.
32. Id. art. 31.
33. Id.
34. See Bederman, supra note 13, at 5.
35. Rules, supra note 23, art. 21.
36. Id. art. 20. Furthermore, the Commissioners are expressly proscribed from hav-
ing any "financial interests in any of the claims submitted to them or the panel to which
they belong." Id. art. 21. And, "[tihey may not be associated with or have financial
interests in any corporations whose claims have been submitted to them .... " Id.
37. Id.
38. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
39. This has been my experience in handling claims with the Commission.
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model.40 The goal of prompt processing of claims is reinforced by the
strict time limits imposed by the Rules on the panels. Panels normally are
to complete their work on the claims before them within six months41 or,
in unusually large or complex cases, twelve months.42
As the Commission begins the task of reviewing the typically large
category "E" and "F" claims, its proceedings will likely become more
involved than they have been in the past. This point is illustrated by the
WBC Claim proceedings where both the claimant and Iraq were requested
to make several rounds of submissions and to attend a hearing in
Geneva. 43 Nevertheless, more complex proceedings at the UNCC will not
lead to the introduction of adversarial proceedings in the traditional sense
in large measure because the Commission was specifically designed to
avoid the delay and higher costs associated with the adversarial process.44
A. The Role of the Secretariat
In addition to its administrative role, the Commission's Secretariat is
charged with providing "legal support to the Commissioners... and assist-
40. Commenting favorably on this aspect of the Commission's structure, Professor
Caron noted:
Historical examples of international claims settlement generally have followed
an adjudicative model. But there are costs to according the due process inherent
in the adjudicative model. Such costs may not be tolerable in the current con-
text. A brief comparison to the operation of the recent Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal illustrates how formidable the Gulf War claims process could
be. [That tribunal] had a docket of dose to 4000 claims. Even with 2,780
smaller of these settled en masse, another 420 bank claims dismissed on juris-
dictional grounds, and probably another 250 claims settled on an individual
basis, the Tribunal operating in three Chambers of three arbitrators is only now,
ten years later, nearing the end of its work In contrast, the Gulf War incident
raises the specter of hundreds of thousands, if not millions of claims. Case-by-
case adjudication in the case of the Gulf War claims likely would lead to justice
greatly delayed and consequentially justice denied.
David D. Caron, The Gulf War, the U.N. Compensation Commission and the Search for
Practical Justice, BOALT HALL TRANscmar, Fall 1991, at 27.
41. Rules, supra note 23, art. 38(c).
42. Id. art. 38(d). Article 39 holds out the possibility that in certain cases the Gov-
erning Council could extend the review periods set forth in the Rules:
If a panel considering a claim or group of claims cannot complete its work
within the allotted time, the panel will notify the Governing Council... of the
estimated additional time required. The Governing Council will decide whether
the panel should continue its work on the claim or group of claims, with a time
limit to be decided by the Council, or should be discharged of the claim or
group of claims, which would be given to another panel.
Id. art. 39. In fact, the Governing Council recently decided that in large or complex
claims, if a panel determines under article 39 that more time is needed to process the
claim, it can take an additional six months without seeking approval from the Governing
Council. See Decision Concerning Further Procedures for Review of Claims Under Article
38, U.N. Compensation Comm'n Governing Council, 19th sess., 57th mtg., at 1, U.N.
Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.35 (1995).
43. For a discussion of the WBC Claim, see infra notes 115-50 and accompanying
text.
44. See, e.g., Caron, supra note 40.
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ance in obtaining additional information" regarding the claims.45 Before
the claims are formally presented to the panels to be reviewed on their
merits, the Rules require the Secretariat to conduct a preliminary assess-
ment of the claims to ensure that they meet the formal requirements
promulgated by the Governing Council.4 6 The Secretariat is also required
to report the significant factual and legal issues raised by the claims to the
Governing Council, the claimants and to Iraq.4 7 These steps begin the
Commission's verification of the claims.
1. The Secretariat's Preliminary Assessment of the Claims
In addition to meeting certain formal requirements, all corporate and gov-
ernment claims must contain a statement of claim that pleads the legal and
factual elements of the claim with particularity.48 These claims must also
be "supported by documentary and other appropriate evidence sufficient
to demonstrate the circumstances and the amount of the claimed loss."
'49
Pursuant to article 14 of the Rules, before the claims are submitted to
the panels of Commissioners, the Secretariat must make a preliminary
assessment of them "to determine whether they meet the formal require-
ments established by the Governing Council."50 Among the items that the
Secretariat must "verify" with respect to the corporate and government
claims is whether they "contain evidence of the amount, type and causes of
the losses."5
1
If a claim does not contain such evidence or if it fails to meet any of
the Rules' other formal requirements, the Secretariat will informally notify
the claimant or entity that submitted the claim and will give it six months
to cure the problems.52 If the claimant takes no action in response to the
informal notification, it will be given formal notification that is has "60
days from the date of that notification to remedy the defect."53 In this
circumstance, a claimant is allowed a "second bite at the apple" with
respect to proving its claim. However, if the defect is not remedied "within
this period, the claim shall not be considered as filed."54 Because the dead-
45. Rules, supra note 23, art. 34(1).
46. See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., U.N. Compensation Comm'n, Category "E" Claim Form, reprinted in
GULF WAR CIuMs REP., supra note 10, at II/CF-41.
49. Rules, supra note 23, art. 35(3). The editor of the Gulf War Claims Reporter has
noted that "[g]enerally, the amount of documentation necessary will have a direct rela-
tionship to the size of the claim involved: the larger the claim, the more documentation
necessary." GULF WAR CLAms REP., supra note 10, at 11-12. However, with respect to the
classification of claims by the panels, it should be recognized that claims asserting large
losses do not always involve the complex legal or factual issues that would require an
extended review period.
50. Rules, supra note 23, art. 14.
51. Id. art. 14(1)(b).
52. Although not provided for in the Rules, this has been the practice of the Secreta-
riat during my tenure at the UNCC.
53. Id. art. 15.
54. Id.
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lines for filing corporate and government claims are now long past,55 a
claimant's failure to remedy defects in a claim after receiving an article 15
notification from the Secretariat will almost certainly result in no compen-
sation being awarded.
On the other hand, if the Secretariat determines that a claim "con-
tain[s] evidence of the amount, type and causes of the losses," it does not
constitute a decision on the merits of the claim but merely results in the
claim being presented to a panel of Commissioners for review.56 Then, the
panel decides whether such evidence is credible and is sufficient to justify
a recommendation to the Governing Council that compensation be
awarded. 5
7
As the Commission begins to focus its attention on the claims filed in
categories "E" and "F," it is anticipated that a large number of corporate
and government claimants will receive notification under article 15 in the
near future. Such recipients should view the notification as an opportunity
to improve their chances of obtaining compensation by resubmitting their
claims in conformity with the Rules. Indeed, as the article 15 notifications
advise, claimants should seriously consider obtaining legal counsel in
making their responses to the notification, as such assistance often results
in higher quality submissions which not only conform to the Commis-
sion's minimum requirement but also better present the claimant's case.58
In accordance with the recent implementation of the "oil for food" deal
set forth in Security Council Resolution 986,59 a percentage of Iraqi oil
sale proceeds must be placed in the Commission's compensation fund.
60
Thus, the odds that successful corporate and government claimants will
eventually receive some compensation appear better now than they did
when many of the claims were originally filed.61 Along these lines,
although the deadline is past for filing new category "E" and "F" claims,
neither the Rules nor other Governing Council decisions prohibit claim-
55. Except in a very few cases involving civil disorder within a claimant country, or
environmental claims submitted by governments, the deadline for submitting category
"E" and "F" claims was January 1, 1996. Decision of the Governing Council Not to Accept
Further Corporate and Government Claims After 1 January 1996, U.N. Compensation
Comm'n Governing Council, 17th Sess., 53rd mtg., U.N. Doc. No. S/AC.26/Dec.30
(1995), reprinted in GULF WAR CLaMs REP., supra note 10, at II/GC-119.
56. Rules, supra note 23, art. 16(1).
57. Rules, supra note 23, art. 35(1) ("Each panel will determine the admissibility,
relevance, materiality and weight of any documents and other evidence submitted.").
58. Id. art. 15.
59. S.C. Res. 986, U.N. SCOR, 3519th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/986 (1995), reprinted
in GuLF WA CLAiMs REP., supra note 10, at II/SC-35.
60. Raymond Bonner, For Victims of Gulf War, the Checks Are in the Mail: UN Com-
mittee Orders Iraq to Pay $3.2 Billion in Reparations, lWr'L HERALD TRB., Dec. 18, 1996, at
1.
61. At least one commentator has pointed out that, even if the Commission is unable
to pay all of the claims in full, merely obtaining an award from the Commission may be
of value to claimants and governments: "[l]t will be useful to governments to have
claims of concern to them assessed and evaluated by an international body. This pro-
cess will provide a sound foundation for the future bilateral settlement of any claims not
fully compensated through the UN mechanism." Crook, supra note 15, at 156.
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ants from supplementing their claims at any time prior to their submission
to a panel for review. Thus, even if they have not yet received an article 15
notification, claimants should consider filing additional evidence or argu-
ment in support of their claims, if such a filing would improve these claims.
2. The Secretariat's Report on the Claims
In addition to making preliminary assessments of the claims, the Secreta-
riat is charged with making quarterly reports to the Governing Council
regarding the upcoming claims on the Commission's docket.62 Such
reports, labelled "Article 16 Reports" by the Commission, must include
statistical information regarding the claims, including the name of the
claimants, the categories that the claims fall within, and the amount of
compensation sought.63 More importantly, the Article 16 Reports "indi-
cate significant legal and factual issues raised by the claims .... 64
The Rules require the Secretariat to "promptly" circulate the Article 16
Reports to "the Government of Iraq as well as to all Governments and inter-
national organizations that have submitted claims." 65 Given the number of
governments that have submitted claims, both on their own behalf and on
behalf of their nationals and corporations, the Article 16 Reports are circu-
lated quite widely. Nevertheless, the reports are not considered public
documents.
66
Within ninety days of the circulation of the Article 16 Reports, "the
Government of Iraq as well as Governments and international organiza-
tions that have submitted claims, may present their additional information
and views concerning the report to the Executive Secretary for transmis-
sion to panels of Commissioners .... -67 Significantly, the Article 16
Report is the first communication from the Commission to Iraq regarding
specific claims. Iraq's response to these reports is its first opportunity to
present its views to the panels of Commissioners regarding both the factual
and legal issues raised in the reported claims. The transmission of the Arti-
cle 16 Reports also presents an opportunity for the claimants to submit
additional legal and factual briefing to the Commission on the issues iden-
tified by the Secretariat.
62. See Rules, supra note 23, art. 16.
63. Id.
64. Id. art. 16(1).
65. Id. art. 16(2).
66. However, because many governments solicit comments on the reports from their
claimant corporations and individuals, the number of copies of these "restricted" docu-
ments in circulation is probably fairly large. Accordingly, the Commission should con-
sider making such reports available to the broader international legal community.
Doing so would increase the transparency of the Commission's proceedings and could
spark additional comment and debate on the Commission's work among academics and
legal practitioners.
67. Rules, supra note 23, art. 16(3). Article 32(2) further provides with respect to
article 16 comments that: "[a]ny information received by the secretariat after the expira-
tion of the time-limits as established in article 16 will be submitted when received, but
the work of the panel will not be delayed pending receipt or consideration of such infor-
mation." Id. art. 32(2).
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3. The Submission of the Claims to the Panels
Following the appointment of a specific panel of Commissioners by the
Governing Council, the Secretariat is required under article 32 of the Rules
to submit a claim or claims to the panel "together with the related docu-
mentation, containing the results of the preliminary assessment made by
the Secretariat and any other information deemed to be useful for the work
of the Commissioners."68 The Secretariat must also provide the panel with
any materials submitted by Iraq and others in response to the Article 16
Reports. 6 9 The Secretariat's preliminary assessment usually takes the
form of an extensive memorandum which analyzes the factual and legal
issues raised by a claim or group of claims and proposes a claim verifica-
tion program.70 The Commission calls these memoranda "Article 32
Reports."
In the past, the Secretariat has often utilized loss adjusters and
accountants to review the claims. 7 1 It is foreseeable that such experts will
make significant contributions to future Article 32 Reports, especially in
unusually large or complex cases. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that, in
reviewing larger and more complex claims, the panels will receive expert
preliminary briefing on verification and evaluation issues, as well as on the
legal issues.
Although the Commission's processing system for the category "E"
and "F" claims is still in the early stages of its evolution, it is probable that
under article 32 the Secretariat will seek to obtain "other information"
regarding certain claims where it "deems" that such information would be
"useful for the work of the Commissioners."72 Such information could
include reports and documents relevant to the claims which are publicly
available or are available within the United Nations system and which pro-
vide useful background information to the panels in their review of the
claims. In certain circumstances, the Secretariat might make available to
the panel claims that are not part of the group of claims presented to the
panel for review.73 These other claims could be used to cross-check
asserted losses to ensure that the same loss is not compensated twice.
Such other claims might also be used as evidence to demonstrate the exist-
ence of certain facts or conditions that are at issue in the group of claims
before the panel.
Moreover, pursuant to articles 15 and 32, once the panels have estab-
lished initial precedents regarding the type of evidence necessary to verify
certain losses, the Secretariat may contact some claimants to obtain such
evidence before the claims are presented to the panels. Communications
68. Id.
69. Id. art. 32(1).
70. Rules, supra note 23, art. 32(1).
71. Id. art. 19(2).
72. Id.
73. In fact, in the WBC Claim, the Secretariat gave the Panel "relevant additional
documents filed in other Kuwaiti public sector oil company claims." WBC Claim Report,
supra note 4, 1 11, at 5-6.
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will be made only in limited circumstances, such as when a claim includes
sufficient evidence to pass the preliminary assessment but lacks the spe-
cific evidence required by the panel to verify a certain type of loss. Accord-
ingly, most claimants should not expect to receive additional
communications from the Secretariat. In fact, it is likely that the majority
of claims in categories "E" and "F" will be processed "as is," without any
further communication from the Secretariat or the panels to the
claimant.
74
Finally, before submitting claims to the panels, the Secretariat will
group them according to, "inter alia, the type or size of the claims and the
similarity of legal and factual issues."75 The rationale for grouping the
claims in this manner is to "facilitate the work of the Commissioners and
to ensure uniformity in the treatment of similar claims." 76 Because the
formal review period is limited, the objective of the Secretariat's extensive
work on the claims prior to their submission to the panels is to minimize
the amount of background work that the panels must accomplish prior to
rendering a decision on the merits of the claim.
B. The Role of the Commissioners
Concerning the review of corporate and government claims, article 38 of
the Rules provides that: "Each panel will make its recommendations on the
basis of the documents submitted, taking into account the preliminary
assessment conducted in accordance with article 14, any other information
and views submitted in accordance with article 32 and any information
submitted in accordance with article 34."77
Discussing the role of Commissioner panels within the context of both
article 38 and the UNCC framework in general, the WBC Claim Panel
78
concluded that the "task" entrusted to it was twofold:
First, the Panel must determine whether all the costs included by the Claim-
ant in the WBC Claim can be considered a direct result of Iraq's invasion
and occupation of Kuwait and thus compensable under the applicable law
and the criteria established by the Governing Council. Second, the Panel
must verify, using expert advice where necessary, that the costs for which
compensation is being sought in the WBC Claim have in fact been incurred
74. It is for this reason that the editor of the Gulf War Claims Reporter was correct in
asserting that "[e]arly evidence gathering and appropriate forms preparation and docu-
ment assembly will likely prove more essential to the success of claims than persuasive
argument at later stages of the claims process." GULF WAR CLAIMs REP., supra note 10, at
II-1.
75. Rules, supra note 23, art. 17.
76. Id.
77. Id. art. 38(c).
78. The WBC Claim Panel Commissioners were: Mr. Allan Philip, a Danish lawyer
and arbitrator (chairman); Judge Bola A. Ajibola of Nigeria, a former Judge of the Inter-
national Court ofJustice; and Mr. Antoine Antoun of Lebanon, who serves as the manag-
ing partner of Ernst & Young's Paris office. Executive Summary of the Report and
Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Appointed to Review the Well Blow-
out Control Claim (The "WBC Claim"), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Compensation Comm'n, 51"
Year, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1996/R.27 (1996).
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by the Claimant .... 79
The WBC Claim Panel concluded that its understanding of its "main
tasks," which require "determinations of compensability and the verifica-
tion of compensable claims,"80 is consistent with the Secretary-General's
report to the Security Council regarding the implementation of Resolution
687 and the establishment of the Commission.8 1 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Panel adopted the Secretary-Generals understanding of the Com-
mission's function:
The Commission is not a court or an arbitral tribunal before which parties
appear; it is a political organ that performs an essentially fact-finding func-
tion of examining claims, verifying their validity, evaluating losses, assessing
payments and resolving disputed claims. It is only in this last respect that a
quasi-judicial function may be involved. Given the nature of the Commis-
sion, it is all the more important that some element of due process be built
into the procedure. It will be the function of the Commissioners to provide
this element.
8 2
The Panel took further note of the Secretary-General's Report in which he
specifically described the role of the panels within the Commission's
framework:
The processing of the claims will entail the verification of claims and the
evaluation of losses and the resolution of disputed claims. The major part of
this task is not of a judicial nature; the resolution of disputed claims would,
however, be quasi-judicial. It is envisaged that the processing of claims
would be carried out principally by the Commissioners. Before proceeding
to the verification of claims and evaluation of losses, however, a determina-
tion will have to be made as to whether the losses for which claims are
presented fall within the meaning of paragraph 16 of Resolution 687 (1991),
that is to say, whether the loss, damage or injury is direct and as a result of
Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
8 3
In essence, the Secretary-General proposed, and the WBC Claim Panel
held, that the panels must decide both questions of law and questions of
fact. There are three preliminary questions of law that the panels must
decide prior to moving to the next stage of its inquiry into the compen-
sability of the claims.8 4 First, does the claim meet the minimum pleading
79. WBC Claim Report, supra note 4, cl 87, at 27.
80. Id. c 88, at 27.
81. Secretary-General's Report, reprinted in GULF WR C.AIMS REP., supra note 10, at
II/M-4.
82. WBC Claim Report, supra note 4, 1 88, at 27-28 (citing Secretary-General's
Report, supra note 10, cl 20, at II/M-7).
83. Id.
84. A discussion of such questions of law is largely outside of the scope of this
Article. However, it is clear that a panel's resolution of such questions will have an
important impact on the approach that is adopted with respect to verifying particular
claims. A panel is not likely to spend its time and resources verifying a claim or a loss
element within a claim that prima fade is not compensable as a matter of law. Con-
versely, there may be situations in which a panel is unable to determine whether a claim
or a loss element within a claim is compensable until additional information is obtained
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and evidentiary standards set forth in the Rules?85 Second, does the
asserted loss fall within the Commission's jurisdictional grant in Resolu-
tion 687?86 Third, does the asserted loss meet the Governing Council's
criteria for compensation?
87
Although the Secretary-General apparently did not consider that the
Commissioners' mandate to resolve questions of fact cast them in a "judi-
cial" role, fact finding presents the panels with some of their most difficult
decisions.88 It is for this reason that the Rules provide the panels with
from the claimant or another entity. In such situations, a panel might engage in verifica-
tion efforts and then later determine that the claim is not compensable on legal grounds.
85. See Rules, supra note 23, art. 35.
86. Under Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq is liable only for "direct" losses
resulting from its invasion and occupation of Kuwait. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 16, 1 16,
reprinted in 30 I.L.M. at 852. Consequently, claims seeking compensation for losses
that the panel decides are "indirect" do not fall within the Commission's jurisdiction.
Moreover, claims arising out of Iraqi debts or obligations existing prior to August 2,
1990 also fall outside of the Commission's jurisdiction and must "be addressed through
normal mechanisms." Id.
87. Notwithstanding that an alleged loss might arise directly out of Iraq's invasion
and occupation of Kuwait, the Governing Council has decided that certain losses are not
compensable. For example, except under limited circumstances, "members of the Allied
Coalition Armed Forces are not eligible for compensation for loss or injury arising as a
consequence of their involvement in Coalition military operations against Iraq .... "
Eligibility for Compensation of Members of the Allied Coalition Armed Forces, U.N. Com-
pensation Comm'n Governing Council, 6th Sess., 27th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/
11 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1067 (1992). Moreover, the Governing Council deter-
mined that "the costs of Allied Coalition Forces, including those of military operations
against Iraq, are not eligible for compensation." Military Costs, U.N. Compensation
Comm'n Governing Council, 12th Sess., 41st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/Dec. 19 (1994),
reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 253 (1995). The Governing Council also decided that the "trade
embargo and related measures, and the economic situation caused thereby, will not be
accepted as the basis for compensation." Propositions and Conclusions on Compensation
for Business Losses: Types of Damages and Their Valuation, U.N. Compensation Comm'n
Governing Council, 4th Sess., 23rd mtg., 1 6, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/9 (1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1037 (1992) [hereinafter Propositions and Conclusions]. In a later
decision, the Governing Council explained this exclusion by stating that "losses suffered
solely as a result of that embargo are not considered eligible for compensation because
the causal link between the invasion and the loss is not sufficiently direct." Compensa-
tion for Business Losses Resulting from Iraq's Unlawful Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait
Where the Trade Embargo and Related Measures Were Also a Cause, U.N. Compensation
Comm'n Governing Council, 8th Sess., 31st mtg., 3, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/15
(1993), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 244, 245 (1995). Finally, the Governing Council recog-
nized that claimants are under a duty to mitigate damages and instructed the panels not
to compensate losses that "could reasonably have been avoided." Propositions and Con-
clusions, supra, c 6.
88. One commentator has pointed out that the Secretary-General's statement that
the Commissioners' role is a non-judicial one "seems ... farfetched" because "the UNCC
is thereby stripped of its character as a legal institution .... " Bederman, supra note 13,
at 19. Bederman continued:
The only question is how the institution is structured to resolve complex inter-
plays of legal and factual questions raised by the claims presented. As the Gov-
erning Council has acknowledged, while it reserves for itself the right to issue
decisions that articulate general rules concerning the disposition of claims, "it
will be up to the Commissioners to identify the applicable principles and apply
them to the circumstances of particular cases."
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several tools that they may use to verify asserted losses.
III. The Rules Governing Verification of Claims by the Panels and the
WBC Claim Experience
As discussed above, proceedings before the Commission are not adver-
sarial.8 9 Consequently, the Rules do not permit the claimants or Iraq to
seek the production of evidence or engage in "discovery" with respect to
claims pending before the Commission. Moreover, while the Governing
Council clearly intended that the responsibility of verifying and evaluating
claims should rest with the panel of Commissioners, 90 it provided little
guidance in the Rules as to how the panels are to verify and evaluate claims
that will not be processed "as is" without seeking additional submissions
from the claimants or other sources.9 1
A. Discovery of Evidence by the Panels
The panels' authority to obtain additional evidence from the claimants is
set forth in article 35 of the Rules. Article 35 requires corporate and gov-
ernment claims to be "supported by documentary and other appropriate
evidence sufficient to demonstrate the circumstances and amount of the
claimed loss."92 It further provides that a "panel of Commissioners may
request evidence required under this article."9 3 Under article 35, the
panels may obtain, at least from the claimant, a wide range of information
necessary to verify and evaluate a claim.
Furthermore, article 35 does not require the panel to use any particu-
lar approach in obtaining evidence from the claimant. Thus, depending on
the type and nature of the evidence required to verify and evaluate a claim,
the panels could make requests for the production of documents, perform
on-site inspections of property, and take testimony from the claimant's
officers or employees in either an oral deposition or written interrogatory.
The Commission, however, has no power to compel the claimant to
produce documents or witnesses for depositions or to permit the inspec-
tion of its property. However, if a claimant refused to comply with a
panel's request for evidence, the panel would likely proceed in a manner
similar to that authorized in proceedings under the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules. 94 In such proceedings, "if a party refuses to comply with any of the
procedural directions given by the arbitral tribunal, the arbitral tribunal
will usually take an adverse inference against that party's position."9 5 Sup-
89. See supra notes 34-40, 82-88 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Rules, supra note 23, art. 35.
92. Id. art. 35(3).
93. Id. art. 35(4).
94. See UNIEn NATIONS, supra note 24, art. 28(3).
95. ALAN REDIFERN & MARTIN HuNTER, LAW AND PRACnCE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMER-
CLA. ARBITRATION 519 (2d ed. 1991). With regard to this indirect power to compel a
claimant to produce evidence pertinent to this claim, one commentator has observed
that:
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porting this point is the fact that the cover page of the category "E" claim
form includes a warning that "[t]he Commission will be alert to claims put
forward in exaggerated amounts that cannot be substantiated by satisfac-
tory evidence or otherwise justified. The making of such claims may have
a prejudicial effect and should therefore be avoided."
96
While article 35 of the Rules covers the Panel's gathering of evidence
from claimants, article 36 provides that a panel may "request additional
information from any other source ... as necessary."9 7 Like article 35,
article 36's scope is broad. The phrase "any other source" very likely
means that the panel can seek information from Iraq, from other govern-
ments that might have information regarding a particular claim, or even
from individual "fact" witnesses who might have knowledge of the events
involved in a particular claim.98 If a panel desires Iraqi participation in the
verification of a claim, this article provides the basis for such action.
It is significant that, here too, the Commission lacks the power to com-
pel a third party to submit additional information. However, at least with
respect to requests directed to Iraq, the opportunity to participate in the
proceedings beyond the role allowed for in article 16 of the Rules should
provide sufficient motivation for compliance with such requests.99 As to
other third parties, it is fair to assume that, at a minimum, those govern-
ments, corporations and individuals who have claims pending before the
Commission would be interested in assisting the fact finding efforts of the
panels, even when those parties' claims are not the subject of that particu-
lar inquiry.
B. The Use of Experts by the Commission
In addition to authorizing the panels of Commissioners to obtain evidence
from sources other than the claimants, article 36 states that the panels may
request "expert advice, as necessary."'100 In addition to the WBC Claim
An international tribunal like this one has no direct means of enforcing its
orders; nor do the UNCITRAL Rules provide for any sanctions in the case of
non-compliance .... [H]owever ... [i]f the documents are not produced and no
satisfactory explanations are provided, the arbitral tribunal may in some cases
entertain the possibility of drawing a negative inference from the party's failure
to respond.
MATri PELLONPAA & DAVID D. CARON, THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES AS INTERPRETED
AND APPLIED: SELECTED PROBLEMS IN LIGHT OF THE PRACTICE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES
CLAMS TRIBUNAL 484-85 (1994).
96. U.N. Compensation Comm'n, Category "E" Claim Form, reprinted in GULF WAR
CtuMS REP., supra note 10, at II/CF-41.
97. Rules, supra note 23, art. 36(b).
98. See generally WBC Claim Report, supra note 4, 11 5, 6.
99. Because Iraq's role in the Commission's proceedings is not that of a party and in
light of its assertion that it is unable to participate more fully due to financial con-
straints arising out of the United Nations' sanctions campaign, Iraq should not be penal-
ized for failing to respond to a request for additional information. If Iraq fails to respond
to a request for information, the panel will simply be required to decide the claim based
on the record prepared by the Secretariat and the claimant's submissions.
100. Rules, supra note 23, art. 36(b).
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Panel, 10 1 the panels in the category "B" and "C" proceedings, acting under
article 36, relied on experts in various fields in processing their claims.' 0 2
Although the panels make the final recommendation of the amount of
compensation required to satisfy a particular claim, the opinions of
experts have had a major impact on the amount recommended by the
panels. Indeed, where verification and evaluation matters present finan-
cial, economic and technical problems, similar to those before the category
"E" and "F" panels, previous claims commissions have given great weight to
the reports of independent experts in arriving at a final decision.
For example, in the I.V.E.M. Claim before the Franco-Italian Concilia-
tion Commission, the primary issue was the value of certain shares in a
company not listed on a public stock exchange. 10 3 To assist in its determi-
nation of the issue, the Conciliation Commission appointed a Swiss loss
adjustment firm to serve as its independent expert. 10 4 In arriving at its
award, the Conciliation Commission "followed the experts' report almost
entirely, both on the appropriate method for valuing such factors as the
output value of the enterprise ... and on the financial results of the appli-
cation of these methods to the particular facts." 10 5 Responding to the Ital-
ian agent's criticism of the experts' report, the Conciliation Commission
set forth its legal position with respect to the report:
[T]he opinion of the experts does not bind the Conciliation Commission,
which ought to base its findings on its own convictions. At the same time,
when it concerns inquiries and assessments which presuppose technical
knowledge denied to members of the Conciliation Commission, there is no
reason why the latter should not adopt the opinion of an expert - so long as
the latter's reasoning is not contrary to the facts which appear on the dossier
or to common knowledge or, of course, to the provisions of the law or the
dictates of logic. 106
101. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
102. For example, the Secretariat retained the Secretary-General of the International
Society of Disaster Medicine to preliminarily examine the claims. Later, the same expert
assisted the Category "B" Panel with its review of the claims. Recommendations Made by
the Panel of Commissioners Concerning Individual Claims for Serious Personal Injury or
Death (Category "B" Claims), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Compensation Comm'n Governing
Council, 49"' Year, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1994/1 (1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 265 (1995).
Experts in medicine, psychiatry, labor law and mass litigation assisted the Category "C"
Panel with its review of the claims. See "C" Report, supra note 10, at 271.
103. V RECUEIL DES DPCISIONS DE LA COMMISSION DE CONCILIATION 153 (1956) [herein-
after REcUEuL].
104. See GILLIAN WHITE, THE USE of: EXPERTS BY INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 143 (1965)
("The Conciliation Commission placed confidence in the 'Schweizerishe Revisiansgesell-
schaft KG."').
105. Id.
106. Id. at 142 (citing RECUEIL, supra note 103, at 177). The Conciliation Commis-
sion continued:
[All that remains for the Conciliation Commission is to ascertain whether the
experts may not, by chance, have exceeded the limits of their science and
entered into the sphere of law, or whether their arguments ought to be regarded
as inconclusive, or whether they conflict with facts known to the Commission.
Cornell International Law Journal
In light of the massive real and personal property losses, environmental
damage, and business losses alleged in the category "E" and "F" claims, the
UNCC panels require significant assistance from experts in the fields of
accounting, loss adjustment, and the environment in order to efficiently
and accurately verify and evaluate the claims and recommend awards.
Accordingly, the Commission has recently entered into contracts with sev-
eral major international loss adjustment and accounting firms, all of whom
will provide support to the UNCC in the verification of the category "E"
and "F" claims.
As was the case with the experts used in the category "B" and "C"
proceedings, as well as those used in the WBC Claim proceedings, the
experts providing assistance with the "E" and "F" claims will assist the Sec-
retariat in preparing its preliminary assessment of the claims under article
14 of the Rules and in preparing reports under articles 16 and 32.107 The
experts will then assist the panels with verification and evaluation issues
when the claims are formally taken up for review. 108 Expert assistance to
the panels likely will include: providing an initial analysis of the claims
and advice regarding what further evidence, if any, should be obtained
from the claimants or other persons; reviewing new submissions by claim-
ants made in response to requests from the Commission; assisting in the
examination of the claimants' experts at oral proceedings; and submitting
a final report addressing the technical issues raised by the claims.10 9
C. Proceedings in Unusually Large or Complex Claims
When it promulgated the Rules governing the panels' decision of corporate
and government claims, the Governing Council was conscious of the fact
that some claims would be difficult to resolve within the standard six-
month review period, particularly without oral proceedings. Conse-
quently, under articles 36 and 38 of the Rules, additional procedures are
authorized for reviewing a claim if a panel determines that the claim is
"unusually large or complex."' 1 0 In such cases, the Commission's pro-
ceedings begin to look more like those of a traditional arbitral tribunal or
claims commission. Article 38(d) provides:
Unusually large or complex claims may receive detailed review, as appropri-
ate. If so, the panel considering such a claim may, in its discretion, ask for
Id.. Accord Starrett Housing Corp. v. Government of the Islamic Rep. of Iran, 16 Iran-
U.S. C.T.R. 112, 198-99 (1987) (considering expert's report, tribunal followed princi-
ples recognized by the Franco-Italian Conciliation Commission).
107. Rules, supra note 23, arts. 14, 16.
108. See, e.g., supra note 102 and accompanying text.
109. See id.
110. For example, article 36 of the Rules states that in unusually large or complex
claims, a Panel may "invite individuals, corporations or other entities, Governments or
international organizations to present their views in oral proceedings." Rules, supra note
23, art. 36. It is within a Panel's discretion to determine the format of such proceedings.
Therefore, a panel's procedure could simply involve the appearance of a single witness in
a deposition-style proceeding or could be more elaborate, involving the appearance of
the claimant and Iraq in a full-scale hearing on the merits of the case. Id. arts. 36(a),
38(d).
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additional written submissions and hold oral proceedings. In such a case,
the individual, corporation, Government, international organization or other
entity making the claim may present the case directly to the panel, and may
be assisted by an attorney or other representative of its choice. The panel
will complete its review of the case and report... its recommendations to
the Governing Council within twelve months .... ill
Article 38 authorizes the panels to seek additional "submissions" from the
claimants - in other words, legal briefs - and establishes the claimants'
right to present their cases directly to the panels with the assistance of
counsel.1 12 Article 36, on the other hand, focuses on the solicitation of
briefing and oral argument from Iraq and others.1 13 Article 36(a) provides
that a panel may "request further written submissions and invite individu-
als, corporations or other entities, governments or international organiza-
tions to present their views in oral proceedings."
14
Given the several hundred category "E" and "F" claims that assert
losses in excess of $10 million, panels can be expected to regularly classify
claims as unusually large or complex. The panels' primary motivation in
so doing will probably be to gain additional time in which to review and
verify the claims before reporting their recommendations to the Governing
Council. However, it would not be surprising if, in a significant number of
the cases, the panel used the classification to hold oral proceedings to
obtain specific information from a claimant or other person regarding a
particular subject or subjects. Thus, claimants and others should not
equate "oral proceedings" with a full hearing on the merits at which the
claimants and Iraq will have the right to present their views and arguments
on the claims.
D. The WBC Claim Experience
On July 30, 1993, KOC filed the WBC Claim requesting compensation in
the amount of $951,630,871, primarily for the work required to extinguish
the well-head fires that were left burning when Iraqi forces withdrew from
Kuwait. 115 The proceedings which followed provide an excellent example
of a UNCC panel's application of the rules governing the verification and
evaluation of corporate and government claims.
111. Id. For a discussion of a panel's ability to take additional time to process a
claim, see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
112. Rules, supra note 23, art. 38.
113. Id. art. 36.
114. Id. art. 36(a). The language of article 36(a), however, is not as broad as that in
article 38(d) in that it does not authorize such persons to present their case (or defense)
"directly to the panel," nor does it provide that such persons "may be assisted by an
attorney." Id. art. 38(d). It is therefore possible to interpret the two articles as giving
claimants, but not others, special rights in the event that oral proceedings are held.
However, such an interpretation seems unnecessarily restrictive. If a panel decides to
invite Iraq or another person or entity to appear at an oral proceeding, it is improbable
that the panel would prohibit the invited party from making its case directly to the panel
or prevent legal counsel from assisting it.
115. WBC Claim Report, supra note 4, '1 1, at 3.
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Although the size of the claim and the complexity of the accounting
issues raised therein make it somewhat atypical of the claims in categories
"E" and "F," the Panel's approach to reviewing the WBC Claim was straight-
forward and is likely to influence the Commission's processing of category
"E" and "F" claims in the future. Because a substantial portion of the
report addresses these issues, the WBC Claim Report is also pertinent to a
discussion of the UNCC's verification and evaluation of claims.
16
1. The WBC Claim Panel's Discovery Program
In addition to a Statement of Claim, the KOC submission in the WBC
Claim was comprised of a video tape that provided an account of how the
fires were extinguished and five volumes of evidence. These volumes
included, among other items, an expert accountant's report prepared by
Touche Ross & Co.117 Due to the large amount of compensation sought in
the claim, and given the voluminous submission, the WBC Claim Panel's
first official act was to issue a procedural order on November 27, 1995
classifying the claim as "unusually large or complex" under article 38(d) of
the Rules. 18
In the same procedural order, the Panel "instructed the Secretariat to
transmit to [Iraq] the documents filed by [KOC] in the WBC Claim, as well
as relevant additional documents filed in other Kuwaiti public sector oil
claims." 1 9 The Panel then requested Iraq to "submit by 28 April 1996 its
response to the Statement of Claim and related documentation, together
with any documentation Iraq might wish to rely on in the present proceed-
ings."' 20 Although it is not cited in the report, by sending such documents
116. As opposed to addressing jurisdictional and compensability issues, the principal
legal issue that the Panel was required to decide before moving to the verification and
evaluation stage of the WBC Claim proceedings was whether Iraq was liable for the
hundreds of oil well fires that were set ablaze in the days prior to the liberation of
Kuwait. According to the WBC Claim Report, "Iraq denies any responsibility for the oil-
well fires, arguing that the fires were caused by allied air raids." Id. 5 80, at 25. How-
ever, the Panel found, based on the evidence and testimony presented, that:
Although part of the damage may be a result of the allied bombing, the bulk of
the oil-well fires was directly caused by the explosives placed on the wellheads
and detonated by Iraqi forces. In this regard the Panel finds the testimony
presented by the Claimant's witnesses at the oral proceedings, which included
videotapes of the explosives placed on the wellheads, as well as the Killin Report,
particularly convincing. The Panel also notes that the evidence referred to by
Iraq is consistent with this conclusion.
Id. 185, at 26-27. In any event, the Panel held that under "Governing Council decision
7, Iraq's liability includes any direct loss, damage or injury suffered as a result of 'mili-
tary operations or threat of military action by either side .... .'" Id. cl 86 (citing Criteria
forAdditional Categories of Claims, U.N. Compensation Comm'n Governing Council, 5th
Sess., 18th mtg., 1 21(a), at 5, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/7/Rev. 1 (1991), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 1045 (1992)). The Panel stated that, in its view, the Governing Council's decision
is "in accordance with the general principles of international law. Consequently, Iraq is
liable for any direct loss ... caused by its own or by the coalition armed forces." Id.
117. WBC Claim Report, supra note 4, 1 4, at 3-4.
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to Iraq and requesting Iraq's response, the Panel was clearly operating
under article 36, subsections (a) and (b), of the' Rules.' 2 1 On April 22,
1996, Iraq responded to the request with a submission that "consisted
mainly of legal argument relating to the Commission's jurisdiction and
Iraq's liability, as well as remarks on the technical and financial aspects of
the claim."
122
The procedural order also contained "extensive" interrogatories to
which KOC was "invited" to respond.12 3 KOC responded to these interrog-
atories in a timely manner and its responses were also forwarded to Iraq
for comment. Again, Iraq took advantage of the opportunity to participate
in the proceedings by filing comments on KOC's interrogatory
responses.' 2 4 On May 14, 1996, the Panel issued another set of interroga-
tories to KOC. The company responded to this second set of interrogato-
ries and, in doing so, submitted another twenty-two volumes of documents
"consisting of invoices and other proof of payment documentation" sup-
porting its claim.125 Having reviewed the further submissions of KOC, the
Panel "determined, inter alia, that in light of the volume of documentation"
submitted to KOC, Iraq should be "allowed to file a written response
thereto."1 2 6 Iraq did not, however, file another submission.
Following the first two rounds of interrogatories, from July 12-17,
1996,
a verification team composed of Commissioner Antoun, as the accounting
expert member of the Panel, an accounting consultant retained by the Secre-
tariat and two members of the Secretariat's legal staff performed on behalf
of the Panel an on-site inspection in Kuwait to examine the accounts,
invoices and other documentation underlying the WBC Claim.
12 7
While in Kuwait, the verification team reviewed invoices worth approxi-
mately $180 million.
128
Although unmentioned in the report, the WBC Claim Panel's interrog-
atories and associated document requests, as well as its inspection of finan-
cial documents at KOC's headquarters in Kuwait, were authorized by
articles 35(4) and 38(d) of the Rules, under which panels of Commission-
ers may obtain further evidence and submissions from the claimants.
129
Likewise, the Panel's decision to permit Iraqi submissions with respect to
those claims fell under article 36(a) of the Rules, which authorizes panels
121. Rules, supra note 23, arts. 36(a)-(b). Because article 36 provides only that a
panel may seek the views of "governments" and information from "any other source,"
the Panel was careful to address its request to the "Government of Iraq"-not to the
"respondent," and sought a "response to the Statement of Claim"-not a "defense." WBC
Claim Report, supra note 4, c 11, at 6 (emphasis added).
122. WBC Claim Report, supra note 4, 12, at 6.
123. Id.
124. Id. l 14, at 6.
125. Id. cl 15, at 6.
126. Id. cl 16, at 7.
127. Id. 1 17, at 7.
128. Id. l 115, at 35.
129. Rules, supra note 23, arts. 35(4), 38(d).
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to request information from other sources. 130
2. The Use of Experts by the WBC Claim Panel
The WBC Claim Report is not accompanied by an independent expert's
report regarding the accounting and evaluation issues decided by the
Panel. This may be due to the fact that Commissioner Antoun, an account-
ing expert, supervised the drafting of the accounting portions of the WBC
Claim Report. Nevertheless, the Panel acknowledged in its report that
expert accounting assistance was provided in its review of the claim:
The Secretariat also retained the services of an accounting consultant to
assist the Secretariat and the Panel in reviewing the accounting materials
submitted by the Claimant and in drafting the interrogatories .... The
accounting consultant also participated as a member of the verification team
in the performance of the on-site inspection in Kuwait and in the review of
the [Touche Ross] working papers. 13 1
It is clear from this reference that the accounting expert played an impor-
tant role in the Panel's verification and evaluation of the documents and
other materials submitted by the claimant and Iraq. Moreover, in the WBC
Claim, the Secretariat retained the consultant to work with both the Secre-
tariat and the Panel in verifying and evaluating the claim, thereby following
the precedent set in the handling of category "B" and "C" claims. 13 2
Retaining experts to assist both the Secretariat and the panels appears
practical for two reasons. First, both the Secretariat and the panels require
expert assistance in their respective roles in verifying the claims. Second,
given the panels' limited review period, it is much more practical to use an
expert who has already been retained than to require a panel to locate and
retain a different expert.
3. Oral Proceedings in the WBC Claim
In its second procedural order, the Panel informed KOC and Iraq that it
intended to hold a hearing in order "to clarify outstanding issues and to
allow oral questioning of the Claimant's experts."' 3 3 Such a course was
available to the Panel because it had already classified the claim as "unusu-
ally large or complex."1 34 On July 27, 1996, two days before the com-
mencement of the oral proceedings, Iraq filed several documents with the
Commission.13
5
Two of the documents were notes verbales13 6 addressed to the Chair-
man of the Governing Council, which requested, among other relief, that
130. Rules, supra note 23, art. 36(a).
131. VBC Claim Report, supra note 4, cl 27, at 9-10. See also id. 1 17, at 7, Cl 155, at
35.
132. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
133. WBC Claim Report, supra note 4, c 115, at 35.
134. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
135. See WBC Claim Report, supra note 4, c 18, at 7.
136. The note verbale is a common type of diplomatic correspondence used to record
a conversation, to explain a state's point of view, or to request that particular action be
taken by the recipient. SeejAmv.s R. Fox, DIcTIoNARY OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE
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the Governing Council allow Iraq to use money from the Commission's
Compensation Fund to finance its legal defense of the WBC Claim and
other claims.13 7 Iraq also submitted letters to each of the three Panel mem-
bers informing them of its request to the Governing Council.
138
Finally, Iraq filed a Procedural Request asking the Panel to: postpone
the hearing until the Governing Council resolved the matter of the financ-
ing of Iraq's legal defense; determine that the Panel in fact "requires 'time
in excess of that available under article 38(d)"' to complete its review of the
claim; grant additional time to Iraq for preparing the legal defense in "'its
totality"'; and, to seek from the Governing Council "'any guidance required
under the [Rules] to take the aforementioned decisions."'
139
OnJuly 29, 1996, Iraq, assisted by its private international legal coun-
sel and government representatives, "presented argument in support of its
Procedural Request."' 40 On the following day, KOC, assisted by its outside
counsel and government representatives, replied to the Iraqi presentation
and objected to the relief sought in Iraq's Procedural Request. 14 1 The
Panel took Iraq's request under submission and the proceedings continued,
focusing on the Panel's questions regarding KOC's submissions on the
merits of the claim. Iraq's representatives continued to attend the proceed-
ings as "observers under protest."14 2
OnJuly*29, 1996, the Panel denied Iraq's Procedural Request holding
that "[e]ven a short postponement of the oral proceedings would disrupt
the Panel's work plan and prevent it from submitting its report and recom-
mendations within the [required] time limit."143 After the Panel issued its
ruling, "the Iraqi delegation withdrew from the proceedings," which contin-
ued in their absence. 144 Following the oral proceedings, the Panel issued a
final set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents to
KOC. Iraq also renewed its request to the Governing Council to grant it
additional time "'to produce a comprehensive Statement of Defense [sic]
on the WBC Claim."
'145
LAW 10, 223 (1997); MELQUIADES J. GAMBOA, ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR
PRAcnCE: A GLOSSARY 314-15 (1966).
137. See Bhushan Bahree, Iraq Stakes Claim to Funds Earmarked for Compensation,
WALL ST. J. (Eur. Ed.), Aug. 1, 1996, at 2. Although the issue is not discussed further in
the WBC Claim Report, supra note 4, Mr. Bahree reports that:
[The Iraqi] government now says it needs some of the money to pay for its legal
defense against these compensation claims .... We do not have the money,
quite honestly, due to the [U.N.] Sanctions" to hire lawyers and other experts,
Riyadh Al-Qaysi, Iraq's deputy foreign minister said Wednesday. Nevertheless,
Iraq has hired a renowned law firm, Lalive & Partners, to press its case for the
funds.
Id.
138. WBC Claim Report, supra note 4, 1 18, at 7.
139. Id. cl 19, at 7-8 (citing Iraq's Procedural Request).
140. Id. 1 20, at 8.
141. Id.
142. Id. cI 22, at 8.
143. Id. cl 21, at 8.
144. Id. c 22, at 8.
145. Id. cTIl 23-24, at 8.
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In addition to describing its written and oral proceedings, the Panel
noted that, as part of its workings, it "held a number of sessions with the
assistance of the Secretariat." 146 These sessions were conducted in private
at the Secretariat's headquarters in Geneva. In accordance with article 34
of the Rules, the Secretariat provided administrative, technical and legal
support to the Panel. 1
47
The Panel, having carried out its procedure for verifying and evaluat-
ing the WBC Claim, issued a final recommendation that KOC receive
$610,048,547 in compensation of the $951,630,871 it had claimed for the
costs of fighting the oil fires left burning in Kuwait by Iraqi forces.148 The
vast majority of the difference between the recommended amount and the
amount claimed was due to the fact that the Panel was unable to properly
verify and assess the residual value of capital assets purchased during the
WBC exercise that were subsequently used in other activities by KOC.149
Additionally, the Panel rejected just over $3,000,000 in claimed costs
because they were "indirect losses" which are not compensable under Reso-
lution 687.150
Conclusion
The most significant challenge facing the UNCC as it focuses on the
thousands of corporate and government claims on its docket is to review
these claims quickly while providing due process to Iraq.15 1 It will be diffi-
cult to balance these competing interests. If the Commission moves too
slowly, a real possibility given the need to verify the large losses asserted in
146. Id. 1 27, at 9.
147. Id. With respect to the Secretariat's close involvement in the Panel's meetings
and deliberations, the WBC Claim proceedings followed the precedent set in the cate-
gory "A," "B" and "C" proceedings. See, e.g., "C" Report, supra note 10, at 37-39 (stating
that all of the category "C" Claims Panel's meetings were held in Geneva with the
Secretariat).
148. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
149. Because KOC argued that the other activities in which the capital assets were
used were compensable under Resolution 687, WBC Claim Report, supra note 4, cl 124,
at 38, the Panel agreed not to reject such amounts out of hand but to permit KOC to
attempt to prove such losses in its other claims pending before the Commission. Id. '1
233, at 66.
150. Id. '1 233(c)-(d), at 66. Among the costs that were rejected as indirect, the Panel
found that certain "firefighting personnel in question appear[ed] to have been regular
staff members of KOC, [and] that the Claimant would have had to make such salary
payments even if there had been no invasion." Id. '1 162, at 48. The Panel also ruled that
costs incurred in supporting the firefighting effort at the Wafra oil field were indirect
because KOC had earlier withdrawn the Wafra portion of its claim after its compen-
sability was questioned by the Panel in the verification process. Id. 1I 218-21, at 63.
151. One commentator has observed that:
A continuing central issue in the work of the Commission will be the balancing
of due process against the need for early and final decisions .... Thus far, in its
work on the small claims of individuals, the Commission has clearly sought
speed and efficiency, even at the expense of normal procedural safeguards. How
the balance will be struck with respect to the larger cases, for which procedures
have yet to be devised, remains to be seen.
Ball, supra note 15, at 49.
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the claims, critics will charge that it is stepping beyond its mandate and
assuming the role of a court or arbitral tribunal. On the other hand, if the
Commission does not do a professional and thorough job in verifying that
the alleged losses actually occurred and are compensable, other critics will
allege that the entire process is nothing but "victor's justice" and therefore
does not set a legitimate international legal precedent.
The WBC Claim experience shows that the Commission can process
an extremely large and complex corporate claim in a timely fashion while
still conducting an independent verification program. 5 2 In order to con-
tinue to verify and evaluate the future claims in a manner that is consistent
with the sound practices established in the WBC Claim proceedings, the
Commission should consider taking the following steps.
First, the Commission must not bend under the natural pressure to
churn out a certain number of corporate and government claims each
month or year. If Iraqi oil money continues to flow into the compensation
fund, it is likely that such pressure will only increase as those with pending
claims press for the speedy issuance of an award and payment. However,
due to the magnitude of the losses alleged in the category "E" and "F"
claims, and the often complex factual situations from which such losses
arise, most of the corporate and government claims cannot be handled
effectively by the expeditious mass claims-processing techniques used to
handle the category "A," "B" and "C" claims.
The Commission's efficient processing of the individual claims may
have raised expectations among claimants, interested governments or
others that the corporate and government claims will be disposed of in a
similar manner. However, these parties must be made aware of the magni-
tude and number of claims facing the Commission. In fairness to both the
legitimate claimants and Iraq, the Commission must be rigorous in the ver-
ification and evaluation of corporate and government claims.'
5 3
152. The initial reaction of one legal commentator to the WBC Claim Report echoed
this point:
The work of the first panel shows that the UN will act fast and will safeguard
Iraq's right to a fair hearing without letting the aggressor nation control the
schedule. This panel also functioned far more like civil law inquisitors than
common law judges. It took on the job of investigation and verification, rather
than relying on the parties to fight it out.
Jannuzzo, supra note 5, at 29.
153. One commentator speculated that proceedings in categories "E" and "F":
[Will vaguely resemble a default proceeding in an arbitration, and the Commis-
sioners will have the role of trying to play the devil's advocate and assess
whether these claims are realistic or inflated. This is also, I think, because in the
back of their minds they will know the overwhelming likelihood that there won't
be enough money to pay everyone.
Ulmer, supra note 15, at 90. While I believe that the WBC Claim experience demon-
strates that the Commissioners are prepared to go well beyond what would be involved
in playing the role of the devil's advocate in a default proceeding, Ulmer's second point
raises an important issue. If it is true that the pool of money from which claims are to
be paid will be insufficient to pay the total amount awarded by the Commission, legiti-
mate claimants have a strong interest in seeing that indirect, ineligible and unsupported
claims are identified and dismissed with dispatch by the panels.
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Second, the Rules severely limit the scope of Iraq's participation in the
proceedings. 154 Even in unusually large or complex claims, where the
Commission has more discretion to design the proceedings, panels should
be careful not to permit Iraq to have a larger role than that provided for by
the Rules.' 5 5 Such a course could lead to serious delays in the Commis-
sion's attempt to deal with its massive docket of claims.
156
Third, the Commission should adopt a strictly legal approach with
regard to what constitutes a direct and, therefore, compensable loss. This
would set clear precedents on compensability issues. To expedite the
claims process, the Commission could submit large groups of claims which
fail to meet the standards for a compensable claim to the panels for sum-
mary disposal. This would leave the Secretariat and panels time to verify
and evaluate the remaining claims for which there is a better case for com-
pensation. Given the limited time and financial resources of the Commis-
sion, it simply cannot afford to waste resources verifying claims for which
there is no legal basis for compensation.
Fourth, because the Commissioners generally serve on a part-time
basis and panels meet only a few days each month to work on the claims,
the panels rely heavily on the Secretariat's legal officers. Accordingly, the
Commission should recruit lawyers with experience working indepen-
dently and handling large and complex cases under strict time constraints.
To meet this need, the Commission has generally recruited experienced
attorneys to handle claims pending before the panels. Such lawyers should
remain the focus of the Commission's recruitment efforts.
Finally, the Commission should commit sufficient resources to the
retention of independent experts in, among other fields, accounting and
loss adjustment. These experts must be capable of undertaking the verifi-
cation and evaluation of complex claims in a limited review period. This
154. See generally Rules, supra note 23, art. 16(3) (indicating that the only submission
that Iraq is permitted to make to the Commission as a matter of right is in response to
the Executive Secretary's report pursuant to article 16).
155. Nonetheless, as the WBC Claim proceedings demonstrated, even within the lim-
ited scope provided for Iraqi input into the claims review process, opportunities exist for
a meaningful Iraqi contribution with respect to verification and evaluation of the claims.
See, e.g., WBC Claim Report, supra note 4, I 20, 24. When such opportunities are
provided, Iraq should take full advantage of them to further its cause. Rather than
rehashing objections to the Commission's jurisdiction over Iraq or making procedural
arguments about changing the Commission's Rules as it did in the WBC Claim, Iraq
should use such opportunities to argue the legal and factual merits of the claims.
156. Professor Bederman has reported that due to the delays inherent in dealing with
a large docket of claims:
Some international claims tribunals were prevented from completing their work,
with the result that some awards were issued, a final report was not forthcoming
and many (if not most) of the claims were left unadjudicated by the commission.
International claims tribunals have been consistently tardy in completing their
business.
Bederman, supra note 13, at 16. Notwithstanding the allure of allowing Iraq to partici-
pate in the proceedings in ways beyond those that the Rules permit, the Commission
must avoid creating any situation that would lead to undue delay and to an inability to
complete its work in a timely manner.
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requirement almost certainly means hiring several in-house experts as well
as retaining major international accounting and loss-adjustment firms that
have the ability to staff claims on short notice with quality professionals
from many disciplines. As discussed above, the Commission has taken an
initial step in this direction, but this step should be followed through over
the long term, possibly by hiring additional outside firms as the number of
claims under active review increases.
Taking these and other steps to promote the rigorous verification and
evaluation of the claims pending before the Commission will help to
ensure that the UNCC realizes its goal of providing swift compensation to
claimants while providing due process to Iraq.

